የ12ኛ ክፍል ኢኮኖሚክስ ምዕራፍ 3
How signalling and screening close an information gap
1:21 · በምዕራፍ 3 ላይ ካሉት 2 ማብራሪያዎች 2ኛው
የ12ኛ ክፍል ኢኮኖሚክስ ምዕራፍ 3 አጭር የ Temari የአኒሜሽን ማብራሪያ፦ How signalling and screening close an information gap። የሚናገረው ሁሉ ከቪዲዮው በታች ተጽፏል። በነጻ ይታያል፤ መለያ አያስፈልግም። ማብራሪያዎቹ በእንግሊዝኛ ናቸው።
ማብራሪያው የሚናገረው ሁሉ
የማብራሪያው ቃላት በየክፍሉ፣ በቪዲዮው ላይ እንደሚጻፉት።
The seller knows more than you
When you buy a used car, the seller knows if it is good or bad. You do not.
One side of the deal knows more. That is asymmetric information.
It gives the seller power over the buyer.
Bad cars are more likely to be picked
Two cars look the same, but only the seller knows one is good and one is bad.
You cannot tell them apart, so the bad ones are more likely to be selected.
This is adverse selection, a problem of hidden information.
The side that knows more signals
One fix is signalling: the side that knows more sends information about itself to the other.
The owner of a good car offers a warranty.
The owner of a bad car cannot afford to, so you can tell them apart.
In the same way, a worker signals skill to an employer through education.
The side that knows less screens
The other fix is screening: the side that knows less learns all it can.
A bank screens people who want to borrow money.
It asks about their financial history and job security, to weed out those who cannot repay.
Asymmetric information
The side that knows more signals. The side that knows less screens.
Save this one for your exam.
የምዕራፍ 3 ሙሉ ትምህርት
በዚህ ምዕራፍ ላይ ያለው ረዘም ያለ የ Temari ቪዲዮ ትምህርት ነው፤ የሚናገረው ሁሉ በገጹ ላይ ተጽፏል።
Public goods and the free rider4 ደቂቃበምዕራፍ 3 ላይ ሌሎች ማብራሪያዎች
ስለ ምዕራፍ 3 ተጨማሪ
የምዕራፉ ገጽ Temari በዚህ ምዕራፍ ላይ ያለውን ሌላውን ይዟል፤ ለምሳሌ አጭር ማስታወሻዎችና የመልመጃ ጥያቄዎች ከመልሶቻቸው ጋር።
የምዕራፍ 3 ገጽ ይክፈቱይህን ምዕራፍ በመተግበሪያው ይለማመዱ
Temari ይህን ምዕራፍ ወደ ጊዜ የተቆረጠለት መልመጃ ይለውጠዋል፣ እየሠሩ ያርምዎታል፤ ያልገባዎትንም የሚያብራራ የ AI አስተማሪ አለ።
በነጻ ይጀምሩTemari.et ለ Android ስልኮች መተግበሪያ አለው፤ በ Google Play ላይ በነጻ ይገኛል።


